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F. N o o n e

and Mary Jo Wiley

Sticks, Stones and Broken Bones:
Military Law's Criteria for
Aggravated Assault

Abstract: In light of recent military court decisions, this article asks whether
the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be revised to encompass batteries which
do not satisfy the present nineteenth century definition of grievous bodily harm. In
answering this question, the article first traces the evolution of the military law of
battery. Current medical views on the consequences of a criminal attack, particularly the psychic effects of violence, are then explored, concluded with a discussion
of the competing considerations which should affect any decision to change the law.

"We f o u g h t "bout a dog--last week it w e r e - No more than a round or two;
But I strook "im cruel "ard, an "I wish I "adn't now,
Which is j u s t what a man can't do."

Rudyard Kipling, "Follow Me "Ome "

Introduction
Kipling's poem fairly expresses nineteenth-century attitudes. M e n - - a t least
those men from the class which supplied common soldiers--fought among themMichael F. Noone is a professor of law at the Catholic University of America. He has also
been a visiting Distinguished Professor of Law at the U.S. Military Academy and has written
numerous articles on civil-military relations. Address for correspondence: Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, Office of the Faculty, Washington, D.C. 20064.
Mary Jo Wiley is a graduate of the Catholic University Law School. She is a nurse and has
practiced in the U.S. Army's health care system.
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selves. And, while fighting was deprecated, it was not considered a serious crime.
Battery, the unlawful application of force to the person of another, was a commonlaw misdemeanor. If, however, the victim's ability to defend himself or annoy his
adversary was permanently impaired, the common law punished the offense as the
felony of mayhem. 1 This distinction, based on the severity of the physical consequences of the attack, still operates in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and this
article is intended to explore the consequences of the distinction in a military which
expects its members to exercise self control in ways quite foreign to Kipling's time.
The 1989 court-martial of Specialist Dormell O. Jones, 3d Armored Division illustrates the difference.2
On the evening of April 28, 1989, four Army enlisted men's wives took a
"ladies' night out," in Giessen, Germany? After drinks and a show at one club, they
went to another, The Big Apple, where they danced and chatted with the patrons. As
they left the club early in the morning of the 29th, they noticed a fast-food stand
(imbiss) and decided to purchase french fries. There was a long line and they didn't
know where it ended. Specialist Donnell Jones, a Bradley fighting vehicle mechanic
with five years of service, was standing in line with a friend and offered to place
their order for them and they gave him money to do so. Jones subsequently placed
his order and was served. As he started to leave the building he told the women to
wait for their food. One of the women, Mrs. Lisa Vender, thought he was leaving
with their money and, as he walked away, grabbed him by the back of the shirt,
demanded their money, and as he continued toward the exit, snatched the currency
he was holding in his left hand, thus dislodging the food he was carrying. Jones
struck her once in the face, giving her a black eye, a small cut on her nose, and
fracturing the bridge of her nose. Despite his pleas of not guilty, Jones was subsequently convicted by a general court-martial of larceny and assault in which grievous bodily harm was intentionally inflicted.4 He was sentenced to a bad conduct
discharge, conirmement for two years, forfeiture of all pay, and reduction to the
lowest enlisted grade.
On appeal, Jones' military lawyer argued that the injuries Mrs. Vender sustained did not meet the legal definition of "grievous bodily harm.'5 An Army Court
of Military Review agreed and, on November 28, 1990, while affirming the larceny
finding and a finding of simple battery, returned the case for a rehearing on the
punishment. 6 On February 28, 1991 the Army determined that a rehearing was not
practicable and granted Jones' request for a "discharge for the good of the service,"
restoring all rights, privileges, and property he lost as a result of his court-martial. 7
The following month, Jones' lawyer used the case in an article emphasizing that
trial defense counsel should not concede that an injury satisfied the law's require-
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ments and noting the difference in maximum punishments available under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 8A simple battery can be punished by no more than a
bad conduct discharge, and confinement for six months while the aggravated offense provides for a maximum punishment of confmement for up to five years and
a dishonorable discharge. 9
On reflection, one might wonder whether the law's distinctions are appropriate in the late twentieth century. Should some provision be made for the emotional-as opposed to the physical--consequences of a battery? The prosecutor in the Jones
case asked only two questions of the victim regarding her injuries:
Q. "How much pain were you in after you were hit?"
A. "I had headaches for a couple of days. I remember it was especially hard
because my husband was gone [on] T[emporary] D[ut]Y and I had two kids.
I had a very bad headache. It was hard to go to sleep at night. And then,
again, from having the cold and trying to blow my nose, sir, it was very
difficult. I couldn't squeeze any kleenex or anything up my nose. At first-I'd say for about--At least the fin-stcouple of weeks was like that."
Q. "And how severe was the pain that evening and the next morning? light?
moderate? or heavy?"
A. "I would say--Well, at fu'st, it was more like a stun. I think it got worse as
the day went on. I got more of a headache. At first it was moderate and then
it got heavy at night especially, m°
Our article asks whether the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be revised to encompass batteries which do not satisfy the present nineteenth-century
definition of grievous bodily harm. In answering the question, we will first trace the
origins of the present Code's provisions. Then we will discuss changing medical
attitudes towards trauma victims, and conclude with discussion of the competing
considerations which should affect any decision to change the law.

The Evolution of the Military Law of Battery
The Massachusetts Articles of War, adopted by the Provisional Congress of
Massachusetts Bay on April 5, 1775 provided in its Sixth Article for punishment of
batteries on superior officers, and in its Twenty Third Article for violence against
persons bringing provisions into the camp. Other batteries would be prosecuted
under the Forty-Ninth (general) article which provided for the punishment of "All
crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which Officers and Soldiers may
be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not men-
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tioned in the Articles o f War...,,H F o r nearly a c e n t u r y - - u n t i l the Articles o f War
were revised in 1 8 7 4 - - C o l . W i n t h r o p ' s treatise on Military Law reports that:
... courts-martial were not invested, either in peace or in war, with a jurisdiction of the violent crimes cognizable by the civil courts, except where the same
directly prejudiced "good order and military discipline." In 1863, however-during the late civil war--the provision incorporated in [the 1874 revision]
initiated in our military law the marked innovation of investing general courtsmartial with jurisdiction, in time of war &c., of the graver civil crimes when
committed by military persons, without regard to whether such crimes directly
prejudice military discipline or affect the military service. Its main objective
evidently was to provide for the punishment of those crimes in localities where,
in consequence of military occupation, or the prevalence of martial law, the
action of the civil courts is suspended, or their authority can not be exercised
with the promptitude and efficiency required by the exigencies of the period
and the necessities of military government? 2
T h e enactment Winthrop referred to was the Fifty-Eighth Article of War which, in
the 1874 revision, provided that:
In time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, larceny, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem, manslaughter, murder, assault and battery with an intent to kill, wounding, by shooting or stabbing with an intent to commit rape, shall be punishable
by the sentence of a general court-martial, when committed by persons in the
military service of the United States, and the punishment in any such case shall
not be less than the punishment provided, for the like offence, by the laws of the
State, Territory or District in which such offence may have been committed. 13
Thus the 1874 revision provided for four categories o f assault and battery
over which a court-martial could exercise jurisdiction:
-

-

-

-

-

-

assaults or batteries directed toward a superior officer in the execution of office,
punishable by death, or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, under
Article 21;
violence inflicted on a person bringing provisions into a camp, garrison, or quarters in foreign parts, punishable by death or other punishment under Article 58;
"serious" assaults and batteries involving the intent to kill or commit rape, and
woundings by shooting or stabbing. These offenses, which need not have service
connection (other than the military status of the offender and the fact that the offense occurred in time of war or rebellion) would be punishable under Article 58,
utilizing whatever sanctions were provided for by local law.
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All other assaults and batteries which would be to the prejudice of good order and
discipline would be punishable under Article 62, "according to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of the court. "~3"

We observe that the m a x i m u m punishment that could be invoked might depend on the status o f the victim (Articles 21 and 58), or the state of national emergency and the provisions o f local law (Article 58), or m a y be left to the discretion o f
the court-martial (Article 62), which was in turn restrained b y a table o f m a x i m u m
punishments issued b y the President. 14The Articles m a d e no provision for considering the severity o f the injury in determining what offense should be charged, nor did
they provide that the severity o f the victim's injuries should affect the m a x i m u m
punishment that could be imposed.
W h e n the Articles of War were revised in the aftermath o f W o r l d War I, the
provisions regarding assault and battery remained substantially unchanged. The
Articles of War of 1920 maintained the four categories established in 187415:
assaults on superior officers and noncommissioned officers were punishable under
Articles 64 and 65 respectively; in the former case the death punishment was permitted; otherwise, punishment was left to the President to prescribe. The Manual
for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army 1928, published as an executive order, provided
that attempted assaults on warrant or noncommissioned officers could be punished
by confinement at hard labor not to exceed six months while striking a warrant or
noncommissioned officer could be punished by a Dishonorable Discharge and a
year's imprisonment, t6
- - intimidation of persons bringing provisions into camp remained punishable under
Article 88 as the court might direct. The offense is not discussed in the Manual nor
was a maximum punishment established by executive order which suggests that
the offense had fallen into desuetude.
- - "serious" assaults were punishable under Article 93 but the requirement for a
national emergency was eliminated as was reference to punishments permitted
by the state where the crime occurred. An elaborate table of maximum punishments was established: any serious assault (with intent to do bodily harm; with a
dangerous instrument; or with intent to commit a felony) warranted a Dishonorable Discharge; if the intent was to commit murder or rape, the maximum period
of confinement was twenty years; if the intent was to commit some other felony,
the maximum was ten years; if the intent was to do bodily harm with a dangerous
weapon, five years; and assault with intent to do bodily harm warranted a maximum punishment of one year. ]7
- - other assaults were punishable under the 96th Article as "crimes, not capital and
not made punishable by another Article of War, which are committed in violation
of public law as enforced by the civil power, m8 The maximum punishment for
-

-
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assault was confinement for three months; the maximum confinement for assault
and battery was six monthsJ 9

When, in 1950, Congress combined the Articles of War (applicable to the
Army and Air Force) with the Naval Articles (applicable to the Navy, Marine Corps
and Coast Guard) and passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice one could still
perceive the lineaments of the 1775 Massachusetts Articles) ° Batteries on superiors
were still treated as separate offenses (Articles 90 and 91) warranting a Dishonorable Discharge and extended confinement--ten years if an officer, five years if the
victim was a warrant officer and a year if a noncommissioned officer. 21 While violence directed at persons bringing provisions into camp was no longer treated as a
separate offense, assault was still treated under the general article, Article 134, which
encompassed disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline,
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital. For the first time in one hundred and seventy five years, assault
was given its own Article--128--and redefined.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents offers a representative nineteenth
century definition of the offense:
A battery, or assault and battery,--for the two terms are substantially equivalent, every battery including an assault,--is any unlawful violence inflicted
upon a person without his or her consent. A threatening of violence, or attempt or offer to exert force against another will not suffice, since this would
be no more than an assault--the assault which is only preliminary to a
battery. 22
The 1950 provision deffmed assault in much the same way, as an attempt or offer to
do bodily harm to another, and battery as the application of force to the person of
another. 23 However, Article 128 defined a new offense: aggravated assault which
can occur either when the means used is likely to produce death or grievous bodily
harm or when, irrespective of the means used, grievous bodily harm is inflicted.
This article is intended to reflect on the term "grievous bodily harm," and the way
courts have interpreted it.
When Congress created the new offense of aggravated assault and provided
that the severity of harm to the victim would be one of the offenses's defining characteristics, it followed British practice when the common law crimes of battery and
mayhem were replaced by statute in the Offenses Against Persons Act, 1861. 24This
model was subsequently followed by a number of states. 25 The British statute did
not define grievous bodily harm. 26

Michael E Noone and Mary Jo Wiley

73

The Manual for Courts Martial 195 l's explanation of grievous bodily harm
said that the term "does not include minor injuries such as a black eye or bloody
nose, but does include fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the
body, serious damage to internal organs and other serious bodily injuries. "27 The
examples raise definitional problems: does any broken bone satisfy the criterion?
how deep must a cut be to make it grievous? what is a "tom member?" when is
damage to internal organs serious? how does one distinguish between serious and
trivial bodily injuries? The drafters of the explanation may have expected that expert medical testimony would be necessary in order to establish that the harm was
grievous. The physician would explain why the injury was serious or why not, guided
by the law's criteria. As in the case of a plea of insanity, the issue would be one of
fact and the opinion of an expert witness, while it might be given greater weight
than that of a lay witness, would not oblige the court to arrive at a particular finding.2S Alternatively, the drafters may have intended that the court draw on its own
experience in deciding whether the harm was grievous. 29
The term "grievous bodily harm" must be interpreted: by legal officers who
have to recommend what offense should be charged; by trial judges who must decide whether there is sufficient evidence of the offense to warrant sending the
government's case to the jury; by juries, who must decide whether they are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense has been committed; and by appeals
courts in the military justice system, who must decide whether the trial judge erred
in permitting the case to go to the jury. 31 Service appeals courts, originally called
boards of review, were given the authority, in reviewing the record of trial "... to
weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted
questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses. "32
Appeals court decisions are published and the rules of law they apply serve as precedent in deciding subsequent cases. The doctrine of stare decisis invokes the principle that a legal rule, and its rationale, should be applied in similar cases. An appeals
court ruling that specific injuries did, or did not, constitute grievous bodily harm
does not constitute binding precedent but offers criteria which legal authorities can
use in deciding whether a given injury satisfies the law's requirements. A survey of
appeals courts' decisions will indicate the military's approach to the problem posed
by the Manual's vague definition of grievous bodily harm.
The first reported decision interpreting the Manual's provisions was United
States v. Lee, in which the accused had been convicted of murdering one man and
wounding another. 33The survivor had been shot in the neck and, in the course of its
1952 opinion, an Army Board of Review affirmed a conviction of aggravated assault, stating "The nature of the injury clearly brings it within the Manual [for Courts
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Martial]'s provision for 'grievous bodily harm.'" The defense had not contended
that the wound was minor so the case has little precedential value.
In United States v. Lara, another 1952 Army Board of Review decision, three
soldiers were convicted of intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm "to wit:
numerous cuts, abrasions, lacerations, and bruises of the face, body, head and limbs
[of the victim]."~ The Board summarized testimony regarding the victim's injuries:
[The victim] received an examination at the dispensary and later went to the
hospital for treatment. He apparently had several bruises about the head and
face, his ankles and hands were bandaged, and according to witnesses, he seemed
to be suffering considerable pain in movement. (R 56, 57, 85, 86, 87). There is
no other testimony in the record relative to the extent or nature of [the victim]'s
injuries ....
In view of the complete lack of evidence as to the nature, extent and type of the
injuries sustained by [the victim] the proof and the findings are insufficient to
establish the offenses charged [i.e. intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm].
However, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of the lesser included
offense of assault and battery...'35
The opinion has been read as a case in which the Board concluded that the injuries
were not serious enough to warrant the description of grievous bodily harm. 36 This
reading is mistaken: the victim was alleged to have sustained "numerous cuts, abrasions and lacerations (as well as bruises) of the face, body, head and limbs." The
govermnent proved that the victim's head and face were bruised, that his limbs were
bandaged, and that he found movement painful. The guilty finding did not match
the proof, which clearly sustained a finding of simple assault and might have sustained a finding of grievous bodily harm if the charge had matched the proof. The
Board of Review decision does not offer precedent for the proposition that bruising,
bandages and pain are insufficient to warrant a finding of grievous bodily harm.
United States v. Bolton, 3r a 1952 Army Board of Review decision, is sometimes used to illustrate the kinds of injuries which warrant a charge of aggravated
assault. 3s In fact, the opinion has no precedential value since the accused was charged
and convicted under the 1948 Articles of War which did not distinguish between
ordinary and aggravated assaults: 9
An Army Board of Review applied the Manual's discussion of grievous bodily
harm to the injuries which the victim had sustained in United States v. Salazar, and
concluded that accused's conviction of aggravated assault could not be sustained: °
The victim had been stabbed in the back, near his shoulder blade, with a knife seven
inches long. The Board of Review described the wound as a "laceration," and sum-
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m a r i z e d the evidence. The examining physician was Dr. Iwata. His examination o f
the laceration
gave [him] the impression that it did not penetrate into the chest cavity. Captain
Iwata applied "several four-four bandages of gauze" to the wound and wrapped
it with an "X bandage," and had [the victim] transported to the Sapporo hospital in an ambulance. [The victim] remained in the hospital for two days where
his wound was given "a couple of stitches" and he received "shots every day"
(R 31,50-51). 41
Here is the B o a r d ' s rationale for overturning the aggravated assault conviction:
Although the use of a knife was dangerous in that it was used in such a manner
that it was likely to produce grievous bodily harm, it did not, in fact, inflict
serious injury. Although the offense found includes the finding that the grievous bodily harm consisted of "a deep cut," there is no evidence that it was a
deep cut. We conclude, therefore, that the evidence sustains only so much of the
finding of guilty as finds the accused guilty of an assault likely to produce
grievous bodily harm by means of a knife. 42
The case has been read as a holding that the wound w a s n ' t serious enough to warrant the charge. 43Alternatively, the case m a y be read for the proposition that a guilty
finding o f a charge of grievous bodily harm which includes reference to "a deep
cut," when there is no evidence o f a deep cut, must be overturned. 44 Because the
guilty trmding was not consistent with the evidence, the B o a r d could only approve a
guilty finding of a less serious offense and did not conclude that the w o u n d was
trivial. 45This alternative reading is more consistent with the language of the opinion.

United States v. Miles, a 1953 A r m y Board of Review decision, is often considered the definitive military legal opinion on grievous bodily harm. 45a Miles was
convicted of assault with an iron bar "wherein grievous bodily harm was intentionally inflicted. "46 The victim sustained a two and a half inch cut on the scalp which
penetrated to the skull; the wound required at least half a dozen stitches, and the
medical officer who examined the victim the following day testified
... the left posterior portion of the scalp had lacerations which had been sewn up.
Around this was a great deal of feeling and it was tender. I gave the man a psychiatric examination in case he had a brain injury but there didn't seem to be anything except that he was hazy. He was slow in answering questions. He was well
oriented and knew where he was... [while the wound was of a type that] could
cause some serious effects [he didn't actually observe any serious complications.]47
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The Board concluded that the Manual for Courts-Martial's definition "leaves a
vacuum between minor injuries on the one hand and serious injuries on the other
hand without a test or guide to determine either. ''4S Turning to civilian court decisions it identified a number of factors relied on in determining whether an injury
was severe enough to warrant conviction of aggravated assault:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

hospitalization or confinement to bed or room;
persistence of injury or its adverse effects;
severe pain or suffering;
unconsciousness induced;
medical testimony as to whether the injury was serious;
unusual force or violence applied; and
interference with normal activities.

The Board went to observe that: "Some courts have probably been influenced
by the fact that the victim was female... ; by the comparative size and strength of
the assailant and victim... ; and by the weapon used .... In view of the fact that it
is the character and extent of the injury with which we are and should be concerned,
it is believed that, aside from the proposition that the question is ordinarily one for
the jury, only the facts (1) through (7) should be given any consideration in determining whether any injury constitutes 'grievous bodily harm' or 'serious bodily
injury."49 Applying these criteria to the victim's injury, the Board in the Miles case
concluded that the issue was fairly presented to the court and that there was no legal
reason to overturn the conviction.
In United States v. Dejewski, decided in 1953, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals spoke for the first time on the issue of "grievous bodily harm. ''5° The court
concluded that the term "grievous" was used in its conventional sense, no explanatory instruction was needed and ruled that the victim's testimony, unsupported by
medical evidence, that he had sustained a fractured jaw and had been hospitalized
for twenty-three days was sufficient to establish the fact that he had sustained grievous bodily harm.
A Coast Guard Board of Review was the first appellate panel to reverse a
conviction of grievous bodily harm because the injuries were not serious enough to
warrant the conviction of the offense. The accused in United States v. Cabuag was
one of five Coast Guardsmen charged with attacking an Army sergeant. 51 Two were
tried before a magistrate in a civilian court, fined $125 and $200 respectively, and
given thirty day suspended sentences. Two others were tried with the accused and
acquitted. The accused was convicted of aggravated assault and given the maximum
punishment available to a special court martial: a bad conduct discharge, reduction
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to the lowest enlisted grade, forfeiture of pay, and confinement at hard labor for six
months. The Coast Guard Board o f R e v i e w ' s opinion, reducing the conviction to
one of simple assault, was careful not to say that the v i c t i m ' s injuries (deep lacerations of the forehead and eyebrow, requiring six stitches; two huge b l a c k eyes, multiple lacerations and a b r a s i o n s - - a l l requiring two days o f hospitalization and twelve
additional days o f treatment) did not constitute grievous b o d i l y harm:
In the case before us the question of whether the injuries constitute "grievous
bodily harm" would appear distinctly to be one of fact to be determined in the
light of the surrounding circumstances. Here the court-martial decided this
question of fact adversely to the accused. We do not say as a matter of law
that the evidence cannot support such a finding. We are clearly empowered,
however, to decide the question of fact differently from members of the court.
[citing authority] Our concern, as stated at the outset of this decision [where
the cases of the other four were summarized], is whether it would not better
accord with the interests of justice here to determine the fact question in favor
of the accused. 52
In the instant ease no special weapon such as a pool cue [as in Lara] or an iron
bar [as in Miles] was used; there was no unusually violent single blow [as in
Miles]; there was no suspected brain injury [as in Miles]; there is not even any
testimony as to pain and suffering as in the Lara case. It is true that there was
hospitalization and stitches, but it does not appear that the wounds were anything but superficial and it is attested that they cleared up in a short time. The
two black eyes, despite their size, plainly constitute only "minor injuries," as
declared by para. 207b(2) MCM.
Upon all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, therefore, it is our
determination that it would better accord with the interests of justice to differ
from the court in the resolution of the question of fact here, and to hold that
the injuries did not amount to "grievous bodily harm" within the contemplation of Article 128(b)(1) UCMJ. Since we find as a fact that the assault was
simple rather than aggravated, a bad conduct discharge is illegal; moreover, a
reduction in the other provisions of the sentence appears to be warranted,
especially in view of the disposition made in the magistrate "s court of the
other two participants. 53
The Board m o d i f i e d the sentence to provide for reduction in grade and confinement
and forfeiture of pay for three months.
The Board m a d e it clear that it had found no legal errors in the conviction but
that, under the circumstances, the sentence was too severe. Rather than ordering a
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rehearing on the sentence, the Board used the peculiar circumstances of the case to
justify its ruling that only a finding of simple assault would be approved. These
circumstances fell into two categories: the punishment imposed on the other two
individuals convicted of the same offense, and the comparatively minor nature of
the offense.
Twenty-one years were to pass before the military justice system reported a
case interpreting the term "grievous bodily harm." In United States v. Spearman, a
1974 Court of Military Appeals decision, the accused had stabbed his victim four
times; three of the wounds were in the victim's side, and one was in his shoulder. 54
The accused contended that the harm was not grievous and that the charge should
not have been sent to the jury because none of the cuts were disfiguring and disabling and did not require hospitalization, although they did require stitching. The
Court rejected his argument, looking to civilian cases and concluding:
The consideration common to these cases is that there was some injury more
severe than that involved in the ordinary assault and that the issue is generally
best left to the faetffmders [citing cases]. We believe that the same considerations apply here and that the victim's wounds in this case transcended any
ordinary battery, endangered his health, and constituted injuries of such a serious nature as to amount to grievous bodily harm2 ~
The opinion seems to turn on three criteria: the wounds which were alleged to
constitute grievous bodily harm were inflicted with a weapon; they required stitching; and treatment took place at a hospital. None of the factors are dispositive but
they were used to explain why the trial judge acted properly in submitting the case
to the jury.
Fifteen more years were to pass before the issue was again raised in a reported
appellate decision. In United States v. Haynes a 1989 Army Court of Military Review case, the accused contended that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that his assault resulted in grievous bodily harm26 He had sliced his victim
across the chest and arm but the physician who stitched up the wounds said that the
injury to the chest was superficial since it did not affect musculature, and injury to
the ann was not serious because it was not a threat to life or limb. The Court rejected
the argument, citing Spearman as authority that decisions as to the seriousness of an
injury should be left to the factfinders, and concluded with the statement; "Our
review of the evidence leads us to the same conclusion as the trial court and we find
that grievous bodily injury did occur in this case. "57
When the Donnel Jones case was submitted to the Army Court of Military Review, military jurisprudence had forty years of experience with the term "grievous
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bodily harm" as it had been used in the Manuals for Courts-Martial. 58 On three occasions appeals courts had overturned a conviction on the grounds that grievous bodily
harm had not been established: the Lara and Salazar decisions in 1952 where the
prosecution failed to establish the injuries alleged, and the Cabuag decision a year
later where, in order to achieve parity of punishment, a Coast Guard Board of Review
substituted its view of the facts for that arrived at by the jury. Donnell Jones' lawyers
had three options: they could argue, as in Cabuag, that the appeals panel should act as
a facttrmder and reject the findings of the trial court; they could attempt to find fundamental differences between the facts as charged and the facts as proven and, as in Lara
and Salazar, have the verdict overturned on those grounds; or, they could attempt to
persuade the court that, for the first time, an appeals panel should apply the definition
of grievous bodily harm in the Manual for Courts-Martial to the victim's injuries and
conclude, as a matter of law, that the injuries did not satisfy the definition.
In fact, appellant's counsel asserted that the injuries suffered by Mrs. Vender
did not satisfy the legal criteria for grievous bodily harm established by the Miles
decision and subsequently applied by appellate courts in the military system: 59
Ms. Vender's injuries were not "of a graver and more severe character than that
resulting from a simple assault and battery". 6° In layman's terms, Vender had a
black eye and a bloody nose--the exact examples that the Manual [for Courts
Martial] gives as being "minor injuries" as opposed to grievous bodily harm.
These injuries are the classic, archetypical injuries that people receive as the
result of an ordinary everyday simple assault and battery. The type of injuries
that kids playing and fighting in neighborhoods get every day of the year. 6~
But counsel did not ask the court to overturn the decision on the legal grounds
that the offense charged had not been proven. Instead, he asked the court to substitute its judgement as a fact finder for that of the jury.
Applying the factors which the Miles opinion had taken into consideration:
"persistence of the injury and its adverse effects, severity of pain or suffering,
... hospitalization or confinement to bed or room, unconsciousness induced,
... interference with normal activities and medical testimony. "~2 Vender's injuries in the instant case are not "grievous bodily harm" under any reasonable
definition of the term. Just as the Coast Guard Board of review did in Cabuag,
this Court ought to determine this question of fact in favor of the appellant. 63
The A r m y Court o f Military Review unanimously accepted the Cabuag
argument:
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The victim required no medical treatment or surgery. She suffered no loss of
function or disfigurement. There was no danger to her life, health, or limb. The
pain was neither persistent nor severe. After reviewing the evidence in accordance with Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, we are not satisfied
that the victim's injuries amount to "grievous bodily harm." [citing Cabuag,

Salazar, and Lara.]64
Arguably the Jones decision had no direct effect on the military justice system
because unpublished opinions have little or no precedential value. Moreover, a subsequent unanimous Army Court of Military Review opinion, United States v. Brian
M. Chapman, joined by two of the same judges, distinguished Jones and held that
grievous bodily harm had been proven? 5 A comparison of injuries, as they were
described in the two opinions, is instructive:

Chapman: Victim rendered momentarily unconsciousness.
Jones:
No loss of consciousness.
Chapman: Victim suffered a comminuted fracture of the nose.
Jones:
Nose simply described as broken.
Chapman: A hemorrhage on the sclera (coating on the eyeball).
Jones:
Hematoma (swelling containing blood) and reddening of the right eye.
Chapman: Significant swelling and bruising around the eye and nose.
Jones:
No parallel statement in the opinion; the opinion refers to a 5 cm. cut on
the nose and the Appellant's Brief refers to swelling. 6~
Chapman: Victim treated at emergency room.
Jones:
No parallel statement in the opinion; however, the night of the incident
the victim was taken by the military police to a civilian clinic for treatment. 67
Chapman: Two follow-up visits to battalion aid station.
Jones:
No parallel statement and no evidence in the record of trial.
Chapman: Victim testified he was in pain for about two weeks; it was a month
before the blood cleared from his eye, and he still had nosebleeds during PT runs three months later.
Jones:
Contrary to the opinion's statement that the pain was neither persistent
nor severe, Mrs. Vender testified that the after effects lasted for a "couple
of weeks," and that the pain was moderate during the day and "heavy at
night."6s
Military prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges will never have the opportunity to make this comparison because neither opinion has been published and the
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records of trial have been retired. However, they will read, in an official Army publication, Jones' lawyer's statement that: "If a case involves not much more than a
broken nose or some other common injury, [defense] counsel has precedent [in Jones]
to support the proposition that grievous bodily harm does not exist."~9
In summary, it can be said that military lawyers will continue to utilize Miles
criteria, which rely heavily on observable physical consequences and disregard the
fact that the victim was a female and the comparative size and strength of the assailant and victim, factors expressly disregarded by Miles. 7° Of course the description
of these consequences will be shaped by the testimony of the medical personnel
who examined the victim. The following section will consider the forensic implications of recent medical research on the victims of assault.

Current Medical Views on the Consequences of a Criminal Attack
The Miles case was decided in 1953 and relied on precedents which, in many
cases, dated to the early years of the twentieth century. Although the somatic effects
of trauma, and the protocols for treating them, have remained relatively constant,
late twentieth century medicine has become far more aware of the psychic effects of
violence. Research is now available which describes the intellectual and emotional
consequences of assault and this research, in turn, suggests new modes of diagnosis
and treatment. The defense lawyer who described his success in the Jones case observed that "In many cases, doctors will testify that an injury is minor while most
laypersons initially might believe it to be serious. "71 Alternatively, an apparently
minor instance of abuse may be serious, and health professionals are now taking
steps to ensure that such cases receive appropriate treatment.
In March 1991 the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations (JCAHO) directed hospitals to establish and follow procedures for
evaluating and treating adult victims of abuse. 72The Joint Commission's 1993 standards require that hospital emergency departments develop criteria for identifying
possible victims of abuse involving physical assault, rape or other sexual molestation, and domestic abuse of elders, spouses, parents, or children. 73 Procedures must
include patient consent; examination and treatment; and the hospital's responsibility for the collection of evidentiary material and the release of information to proper
authorities. TM The emergency service must maintain a list of agencies that evaluate
and care for abuse victims 75and there must be documentation of treatment, referrals
and reporting. TM Finally, there must be a plan for educating staff on the medico-legal
criteria for identifying and handling victims of abuse. Military treatment facilities
are subject to these standards so it can be expected that, after initial physical needs
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are met, emergency room physicians will refer assault victims to a psychiatrist or
social worker to evaluate and treat asomatic conditions.
While the accreditation requirement is new, professional recognition of the psychological needs of physically abused patients can be traced to the 1970s. 77Although
much of the literature focuses on rape, child abuse, and recurring domestic violence
(the "battering syndrome"), procedures developed for the diagnosis and treatment of
the abused elderly or of battered women TMare appropriate in any case involving physical a b u s e . 79 Health professionals have, in the past ten years, become more aware of the
need to assess the possibility of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 8°
While documentation will facilitate proof of injuries, and treatment, the military legal system will have to decide whether the victim has sustained grievous
bodily harm. s~ If the trauma renders the servicemember medically unfit for further
military service it would presumably constitute grievous bodily harm within the
meaning of the Manual for Courts Martial. s2As the Miles criteria become less clear-no loss of consciousness; outpatient visits instead of hospitalization; persistence of
the injury measured in weeks or days rather than months or years; pain described as
"persistent" rather than "severe"; and only moderate interference with normal activities-the importance of medical testimony increases, a3However, th e term "grievous bodily harm" has no medical meaning, and the appeals opinions cited in Miles
to illustrate the use of medical testimony give no guidance on the kind of medical
testimony which would establish severity. The cases Miles looked to as precedent
were decided between 1895 and 1943 u and, with one exceptions5 were used to illustrate cases where Texas appeals courts had reversed convictions because of medical
testimony even though the injuries were of a "... nature.., which would probably
motivate courts of other jurisdictions to affirm. ''s~
The Manual for Courts Martial discussion of the term "grievous bodily harm"
emphasizes the physical consequences of the assault, and attempts to distinguish between short term after-effects--a black eye or a bloody nose--from those of longer
duration. 86"Consequences which would qualify as serious enough to warrant charging
aggravated assault are described in physical terms: "fractures," "deep cuts," and "tears."
The drafters of the Manual did not discuss the possibility that the psychological aftereffects of trauma, in themselves or in conjunction with physical aftereffects otherwise
minor, might be serious enough to constitute grievous bodily harm. There are institutional, historical, and cultural explanations for this lacuna and the legal implications
of their silence will be considered in the final section of this article. Certainly medical
literature in the past half century--and it must be remembered that the Manual's language was written forty-four years ago, and based on the experience of World War
II--has come to recognize the potential severity of asomatic trauma.
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The third edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders s7
published by the American Psychiatric Association describes the essential feature of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, as "the development of characteristic symptoms
following a psychologically distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience (i.e., outside the range of such common experiences as simple bereavement, chronic illness, business losses, and marital conflict) .... 88 The trauma
may be experienced alone (e.g., rape or assault) or in the company of groups of
people... The disorder is apparently more severe and longer lasting when the stressor
is of human design.'89 While the stressor criterion based on the need for an event to
be outside the range of usual experience has been criticized 9° as has the requirement
that symptomatology continue for at least one month, 9~ experts agree that impairment may be severe and affect nearly every aspect of life. 92The literature also establishes that violent crimes (such as assault) are more psychologically disturbing than
less violent crimes and thus increase the need for mental health assistance. 93 The
Miles opinion 94 suggested that persistence of adverse effects and interference with
normal activities were indicia of aggravated assault. And although Miles said that
the fact that the victim was female should have no effect on the criteria for determining aggravated assault, maxillofacial (jaw) injuries arising from an assault may
be more common among women than men. These injuries 95 are often caused by a
male's assault 9~ and women are more affected than men by facial injuries. 97 It is
recognized that there are sex related differences in health and illness 98and that criminal
trauma's long term effects on women's health are severe. 99 Thus recent data suggests that Miles criteria must be applied in the context of medical developments in
the recognition and treatment of traumatic injuries. However, the question remains:
when the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial speak of
grievous "bodily" harm are they speaking only of injuries to the body that can be
externally observed? That will be the subject of the Fmal section of this article.

Psychic Injury as a Component of Grievous Bodily Harm
Traditionally the emotional state of the victim was irrelevant in the law of
crimes. The offense of assault was established whether the victim shrugged off
the attack or sustained mental pain for the rest of his life. Criminal law made
allowance for adverse consequences--mental or physical--by giving judges discretion to impose a wide range of punishments dependent on mitigating or aggravating factors.~°° Victorian efforts to rationalize the criminal justice system by
classifying and punishing crimes according to the degree of seriousness were duplicated in the United States. 1°1 State statutes which "sought to create a range of
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personal injury offenses focusing upon the means by which the actor caused or
threatened the injury, the person upon whom the injury or threat was inflicted, and
the seriousness of the injury caused or threatened" served as models for the Uniform Code of Military Justice.~°2
However there were two differences between state assault statutes and the
UCMJ. The typical state assault statute provided for more severe punishments than
the UCMJ. New York was representative: "maiming (15 years [maximum imprisonment]); assault with a deadly weapon or a destructive or noxious thing (ten years),
inflicting grievous bodily harm or assault with any weapon (five years), and simple
assault or battery (one year). 1°3 Under the UCMJ, the maximum punishment for
maiming was seven years; for assault with a deadly weapon three years; and for
simple assault or battery six months. The UCMJ prescribed five years confinement
as the maximum punishment for intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm with
or without a weapon. 1°4Unlike the UCMJ, those state statutes which utilized severity of injury as a factor formally defined "serious bodily injury" (the term that had
come to replace "grievous bodily harm"), and distinguished it from bodily injury.
The Miles survey ~°5of American law concerning grievous bodily harm assumed that
the Manual's descriptive definition was identical with state statutes which the cases
cited in Miles interpreted and that state statutes defining grievous bodily harm could
be treated as sufficiently similar so that differences between statutes did not affect
state courts' judicial interpretations of the term. ~°6 In 1992, a year after the Jones
and Chapman cases were decided by Army courts, American Law Reports published a comprehensive survey of state and federal approaches to the problem posed
in those cases. Entitled "Sufficiency of Bodily Injury to Support Charge of Aggravated Assault," this analysis of over four hundred appeals court decisions illuminated distinctions created by differing statutory language. ~°7 Only five opinions
addressed the issue of whether mental injury is comprehended by statutory definitions of serious injury. In four cases, decided in two states, the response was negative. Arizona's statute defining aggravated assault requires "serious bodily injury"
which is in turn defined as "injury which creates a reasonable risk of death, or which
causes serious and permanent disfigurement, or serious impairment of health or loss
or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb. ~°s In 1983 an
Arizona appeals court concluded that the legislature intended that the impairment
be physical, and that the adverse emotional consequences of a rape would not sustain a conviction for aggravated assault ~°9and its precedent was followed in a 1987
Arizona appeals court decision interpreting the same statutory provision. H°
Connecticut's assault statute defines serious physical injury as one which "creates a
substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment
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of health, or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. "111 In
State v. Rossie, 112a 1978 opinion, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that a
psychiatric diagnosis of post-trauma reaction did not satisfy the statutory requirement for serious physical injury, and that precedent was followed in a 1985 Connecticut Supreme Court d e c i s i o n . 113
Both states' statutes followed the definition of serious bodily injury proposed
by the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code114: "bodily injury which creates
a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. ''115
The Model Code, however, envisioned three categories of assault116: scuffles entered into by mutual consent, which would be treated as petty misdemeanors (carry
a maximum term of 30 days imprisonment); assaults which cause bodily injury,
defined as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition, which
would be treated as a second degree felony, punishable by maximum term of 10
years, and aggravated assault which would be treated as a third degree felony, punishable by imprisonment in excess of ten years) 17 The Model Code's maximum
punishment for aggravated assault is more than double that provided for in the UCMJ.
The federal government 1Is and other states have not attempted a definition
of the term and have relied on what has been called "the common-law meaning of
a common-law term. "n9 Only one reported decision from these jurisdictions has
considered whether emotional injuries would satisfy the law's requirements. In
State v. Everhardt, a 1990 decision of the South Carolinia Supreme Court, the
Court concluded that evidence that the victim of sexual assaults had suffered a
mental injury which required several hospital admissions and medication was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault causing serious bodily harm. 120
The Court's reasoning--that bodily harm includes mental injuries which may be
more severe and of longer duration than their physical counterparts--could be
applied in an Article 128 UCMJ prosecution without revising the Manual for Courts
Martial's definition which excludes minor injuries. TM Does The Manual's definition need to be reinterpreted?

Conclusion
Donnell Jones's case exemplifies the dilemma posed by the present assault
provisions of the UCMJ. He struck Mrs. Vender under circumstances which warranted a criminal investigation and preferment of charges. Either he would be charged
with a simple battery--the same offense which would be charged in a scuffle entered into by mutual consent--or he would be charged with aggravated assault. The
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UCMJ, unlike the Model Penal Code, offers no third alternative. 122 Once he was
charged, the trial judge quite properly decided that the evidence of physical injury
was sufficient to warrant sending the charge of aggravated assault to the jury. n3
Although the prosecutor in the Jones case, unlike the prosecutor in the Chapman
case, made no effort to portray the injury as serious (possibly because the defense
counsel did not challenge this contention), the jury found Jones guilty of the charged
offenseJ 24 On appeal, the Army Court of Military Review substituted its judgment
as a fact finder for that of the jury and concluded that the injury was not serious
enough to warrant a conviction of aggravated assault. The decision was unpublished and had it remained unpublicized it would have no effect on anyone other
than Donnell Jones.
However the summary of the decision in the Army Lawyer .25 may affect the
judgments of military lawyers of all the armed services, since the publication is
distributed throughout the Department of Defense. The precedential value of United
States v. Miles T M will be reinforced although the Miles opinion misread three of
four prior military opinions on aggravated assault and failed to distinguish, in its
discussion of state cases, those jurisdictions which had statutorily defined serious
bodily harm from those which had not. 12~ The precedential value of United States
v. Cabuag neb will be misunderstood to stand for the proposition that judges have
held, as matter of law, that certain injuries do not constitute grievous bodily injury ~2srather than--as was actually the case--that appeals court judges may exercise their fact finding authority and substitute the jury's judgment for their own.
Further, the article's emphasis on bodily harm may lead uninformed readers to
conclude that psychological harm could never be "grievous" within the meaning
of Article 128.
The potential for misunderstanding is particularly grave as military hospitals,
in response to JCAHO accreditation standards, establish more comprehensive protocols to identify assault victims and health care providers strive to ensure that the
psychological needs of trauma victims are met. n8 The record of trial in the 1991
aggravated assault case of United States v. Donna L. Barnes, illustrates military
medicine's response. The Court of Military Appeals opinion describes the assault
which, like Mrs. Vender's, occurred at an Army cassern in Germany. "For the next
hour or 2 [sic] Pvt. S was subjected to various assaults. Appellant [Barnes] repeatedly hit Pvt. S in the face with her fists and a combat boot while holding on to Pvt.
S's hair. Appellant also lit PVT S's hair and T shirt on fire. Finally, appellant and
Pvt. D took off all of Pvt. S's clothes, tied her hands and feet to the bed with shoelaces, and stuffed a sock in her mouth. The appellant proceeded to beat Pvt. S with
a plastic coat hanger, m29
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While Barnes's defense counsel did not argue, as had defense counsel in the
Jones case, that these were "the type of injuries that kids playing and fighting in
neighborhoods get every day of the year," Private S, like Mrs. Vender, suffered no
loss of function or disfigurement. ~3° There was no danger to her life, health or
limb. The pain was neither persistent nor severe. These facts had persuaded the
Army Court of Military Review to conclude that Mrs. Vender had not sustained
grievous bodily harm. TM However Private S, unlike Mrs. Vender, was seen by a
military physician and admitted to hospital although her injuries were superficial/ 32 Unlike Mrs. Vender, Private S was X-rayed; X-rays of the chest, lungs, cspine (neck) and facial bones were within normal limits, indicating no clinical
fractures. Unlike Mrs. Vender, Private S was sent for an emergency psychiatric
consult after her physical injuries were treated. A psychiatrist concluded that she
was not suicidal but referred her for further assessment. Two days later, in a follow-up psychiatric exam, concern was expressed over the emotional trauma resuiting from the beating and arrangements were made for outpatient treatment
after her release from the hospital. Private S sustained no fractures or dislocated
bones, no deep cuts or torn members of her body and no serious damage to internal organs. In fact, the only Miles criterion she clearly met was hospitalization-but single persons like Pvt S. who are barrack residents are routinely hospitalized
in order to ensure that they are adequately cared for. If asked, Mrs. Vender probably would have refused hospitalization. She had to care for her two children
because her husband was away. ~33
Barnes's conviction and sentence to a dishonorable discharge, confinement
for four years, and total forfeitures has been confirmed. Perhaps she merited the
punishment--as Donnell Jones did not--because her assault extended over two
hours and reflected a depraved mind. However, if Miles criteria, and the language
of the Manual for Courts Martial are to be taken literally--the question remains:
were Private S's injuries more grievous than Mrs. Vender's? We conclude that
they were not. Like the victim in the Chapman case, her treatment was more comprehensive and the prosecutor was more aggressive. TM Our conclusion suggests
that legal and medical considerations dictate that the assault provisions promulgated by the Provisional Congress of Massachusetts in 1775, and amended by the
Congress of the United States in 1950 need to be re-examined. We believe that the
fundamental statute would benefit from revision: in order to distinguish truly minor affrays from those where some injury was inflicted, as suggested by the American Law Institute; and to provide for an array of maximum sentences which would
provide that aggravated assault be charged only in the most serious cases--leaving the Donna Barnes in the criminal justice system to be tried for assault causing

88

Feminist Issues/Spring 1994

bodily harm. However, neither the statute nor the Manual for Courts Martial need
be amended to provide for more sensitivity among lawyers to the psychic consequences of assault. Prosecutors must ensure that victims, unlike Mrs. Vender, describe the aftermath of the trauma. 135 Judges at both the trial and appellate level
must treat Miles criteria with suspicion. Men and women in the armed forces will,
on occasion, continue to strike each other. It is up to the law to decide when the
blow is "cruel hard." It could do better.
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